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ABSTRACT At the close of 2010 an immediate effect of the rule changes to the 
European Union’s budgetary powers brought in by the Lisbon Treaty was a non-
agreement of the annual budget for 2011, which was repeated for the budgets of 
2013 and 2015. Interviews and documents show that the European Parliament lost 
and the Council won in determining spending outcomes for 2011 and immediate 
payments for the subsequent years; whether this also resulted in lower budgets 
overall is ambiguous. When spending increased, this was in line with the will of the 
Council. The most significant variable was the change in the rules, which shifted the 
location of the default budget or reversion point to Council’s advantage if there were 
no agreement. 
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This paper analyses whether the changes of the Lisbon Treaty have led to lower 
amounts being available for spending. In the inter-institutional game of European 
Union (EU) budget policy, the paper also investigates which institution loses most 
through these changes. Whereas a previous paper (Benedetto 2013) presented 
some hypothetical scenarios to answer these questions, the current paper applies 
the theory and analyses it empirically. Although this paper analyses the procedures 
for the annual budget, it makes reference to the EU’s multiannual financial 
frameworks (MFFs)i where necessary, since they govern spending maximums and 
their negotiations overspill into the politics of the annual budget. 
The paper presents an overview on comparative budgets and the EU budget. Next, it 
presents a theoretical discussion that includes a number of assumptions about 
budgetary outcomes. The paper shows that the new rules shifted the default position 
if no annual budget is agreed, leading to an unanticipated loss of power for the 
European Parliament (EP). Finally, the paper presents descriptive data, which draw 
on the amounts agreed for spending from 2007 to 2016 and on official statements 
and elite interviews with key officials involved in the EU’s annual budgetary 
negotiations, compiled between 2010 and 2012. A concluding discussion follows at 
the end. 
 
2. WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT THE EU BUDGET 
This section reviews the literature relevant to the EU budget, explains its procedures, 
and presents the theoretical approach of the paper. 
Citi (2015) applies time series analysis to measure the fluctuations in spending 
across the principal areas of policy from 1979 to 2013. He finds construction of 
coalitions in the Council, the ideological location of Council and EP members, and 
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the enlargement of the EU to poorer member states determine budget change. He 
does not test for the effect of rule changes of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Citi (2013) also finds that punctuated equilibrium explains long periods of little 
change in the EU budget followed by short but significant changes, which often seem 
to cohere with the commencement of each MFF. The research that I present reveals 
continuity of spending or modest increases but below the level proposed by the 
European Commission, while the constraints of the Lisbon Treaty after 2009 are 
similar to those of a punctuated equilibrium.  
The annual budget of the EU is decided by a new procedure that for the EP carries 
significant differences compared to ordinary legislation (Benedetto and Høyland 
2007). At each step of the new procedure, Crombez and Høyland (2015: 74-79) use 
backward induction to analyse what happens. They find that the EP gains no 
influence from its veto power, and in this they differ from Cameron (2000: 198), who 
in the context of US congressional politics argues that the threat of veto can lead to 
policy concessions. Crombez and Høyland (2015) and, to a lesser extent, Citi (2015) 
find that party or ideological positions affect budgetary outcomes. Although the EP is 
a party-based institution, for the sake of simplicity this paper treats it as a unitary 
actor.  
The old procedure, analysed in detail elsewhere (Benedetto and Høyland 2007; 
Benedetto 2013), had been in operation for all budgets until that of 2010. Under its 
rules, there were two types of spending: compulsory and non-compulsory.ii  
The Lisbon Treaty replaces the old articles 272-3 EC with the new articles 314-5, 
and this changes the consequences of negotiation breakdown (Crombez and 
Høyland; 2015). At the Council-EP conciliation committee, the Council by qualified 
majority and the EP must agree with each other for a budget to pass. Either side can 
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reject by failure to agree. If this happens, monthly default budgets take effect as 
before, which the Council may increase. The EP gains the power to freeze spending 
in these, but loses all power to increase. Non-agreement therefore becomes less 
palatable for the EP but more likely since it is the consequence of failure to agree on 
everything. The ease of mutual veto is at the core of the procedure’s poor design 
(Crombez and Høyland 2015: 67). 
Across political systems, budget powers vary. If there is no agreement, the status 
quo is not an option if annual re-approval of the budget is required, in which case the 
reversion point applies. The reversion point for budgets could be zero expenditure, a 
roll-over of the spending from the previous year, or simply the amount that the 
executive proposes (Wehner 2010: 28). The reversion point for the EU’s budget if 
unamended is the lower of either a roll-over or the European Commission’s proposal, 
whereas for amending budgets that could increase spending, the reversion point is 
simply the status quo. To safeguard its preferences, the Council can propose a 
budget, which the European Parliament prefers only marginally more than the 
reversion point budget that would otherwise take effect.  
The EU’s annual budgets have since 1988 been agreed within the ceilings (spending 
maximums) established by the MFFs. The old article 272.9 EC allowed for the 
ceilings for non-compulsory expenditure to be overshot if the EP by a three-fifths 
majority together with a qualified majority in the Council so agreed. The new treaty 
deletes the old article 272.9, meaning that an overshoot of the ceilings is possible 
only with the unanimous agreement of the Council.iii  
So the position of the reversion point has moved closer to the preferences of a 
blocking minority in the Council that can choose to activate it. Understanding the EP 
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as a legislature and the Council, representing national governments, as an 
executive,iv we see that the legislature’s powers of amendment are reduced. 
Although the comparative budgets literature (c.f. Cheibub 2006: 353; Persson and 
Tabellini 2003: 23) offers some insights according to whether a parliamentary or 
presidential system applies, the most significant variable is not the system type but 
the power that the legislature has to amend the budget (Wehner 2010: 95). 
The EP lacks a credible veto power in the new procedure due to the shift in the 
reversion point in which the EP may make “freezes only” amendments and the loss 
of the power to increase what used to be non-compulsory spending within the 
ceilings for expenditure. The EP is confronted by a heterogeneous Council 
consisting in a simplified form of three collective actors: i) the core Noordwijk Group 
composed of several net contributor states including the UK, which wish to cut the 
budget, but which alone cannot mount a blocking minority to prevent agreement; ii) a 
majority of member states, but below the threshold for a qualified majority, which 
wish for continuity in spending or increases in line with the MFF ceilings; iii) in the 
middle, Germany, France, and some others that hold a pivotal position between cuts, 
continuity, or moderate increases, and may opt to vote with the core members of the 
Noordwijk Group. 
Crombez and Høyland (2015: 77-78) also allude to the role of pivotal member states. 
Moreover, they find that a qualified majority in the Council always commands a 
majority in the EP, whereas a majority in the EP cannot be sure of commanding the 
support of the Council with effects on outcomes. 
 




Figures 1 and 2 are a simplistic comparison of the hypothetical outcomes in 
spending decisions before and after the Lisbon Treaty according to the reversion 
points (RPs) available. Whichever institution is furthest from either the status quo 
(SQ) or the RP will lose. The RP could be the SQ if non-agreement of the budget 
results in a roll-over of the previous budget. If the EP grows more distant from the 
RP, it will lose annual budgetary battles.  
These hypothetical outcomes presuppose that the European Commission, the EP 
and the pro-spending member states want more spending, the Council’s pivot for a 
qualified majority vote (QMV), Germany, wants less, and the states in the core 
Noordwijk Group (NG) want still less. Because the EP was constrained by the MFF 
ceilings it could only set non-compulsory expenditure (NCE) at a level below its 
preference but above what the Council would have wanted. This is the RP for NCE. 
The Council by QMV could establish compulsory expenditure (CE) and could raise 
the ceilings in NCE. Both of these outcomes potentially increase spending compared 
to the SQ. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty (Figure 2), resort to the RP becomes more likely, the 
Council then sets spending by QMV, the only option of the EP is to freeze spending 
and not to increase, and Council unanimity is required to raise the spending ceilings. 
These outcomes shift the RP for all spending to the ideal point of the Council’s QMV 
pivot. Meanwhile, the core Noordwijk Group (NG) gains a veto over raising the 
spending ceiling meaning that the ceiling’s RP is the SQ. 
Although resort to the RP is more likely under the Lisbon rules, it is not certain to 
happen because the EP and Council may agree with each other. In this case the 
finding of Crombez and Høyland (2015) that a qualified majority in the Council 
commands a majority in the EP has valence. The credible threat of a reversion 
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budget is likely to strengthen some institutions over others during the course of the 
annual procedure. As I have already shown (Benedetto 2013), Article 315 TFEU 
allows the EP to win if it wishes to adopt a more austere budget than the Council.  
If the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the budgetary power of the executive Council 
then we should expect that budgets will be smaller if the EP wants to spend more 
and national governments want to spend less. The abilities of the legislature to 
amend and to set the RP are reduced by the Lisbon Treaty and lie at the heart of the 
analysis that follows. Has this change led to lower budgets? Alternatively, if budgets 
have remained restrained and if the public preferences of Council and EP have 
moved closer together, is this due to the credible threat of using the reversion point 
rather than preferences in common between the two institutions? 
Two hypotheses guide the empirical analysis on the process of agreement of annual 
budgets since 2007 comparing those from before and after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Lisbon Treaty reduces the power of the European Parliament 
over the EU’s annual budget 
 
Crombez and Høyland (2015) note the limited influence of the EP in the poor design 
of the budget procedure, but do not compare this state of affairs to that before the 
Lisbon Treaty. I analyse how this treaty outcome was reached and I also analyse the 
EP’s theoretical loss of power by means of a number of hypothetical scenarios 
elsewhere (Benedetto 2013). In the current paper, I use qualitative data to test the 
same hypotheses. The only way in which the EP would win from the new rules is if it 
wants more austerity in EU spending than the Council. I therefore start with the 
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assumption that the new rules are inherently deflationary, which would be consistent 
with the findings of Citi (2013) that budget spending is prone to punctuated 
equilibrium. This effect is predicted by hypothesis 2.1. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Following the Lisbon Treaty, annual budgetary amounts approved 
will be lower. 
 
The reversion point could have another effect if, instead of being used by the Council 
to overpower an EP that had voted for spending increases, it operated as a credible 
threat leading to a moderation of the EP’s official position, which would be consistent 
with the finding of Crombez and Høyland (2015) that a qualified majority in the 
Council can secure majority support in the EP. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Following the Lisbon Treaty, the spending demands of the Council 
and the European Parliament will be closer to each other 
 
In the next sections, these assumptions will be analysed first by looking at the annual 
amounts voted since 2007 (before and after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty) by 
means of descriptive data comparing for each year: i) agreed amounts; ii) final 
amounts including sums that follow in amending budgets; and iii) the amounts 
initially desired by the Council and EP (Table A1 in the appendix). Second, an 
analysis follows that draws on elite interviews with key actors involved in negotiating 
the 2011 and 2012 budgets. Official statements and coverage by specialist media 
furnish the coverage of the budgets of 2013 to 2016. 
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The analysis is informed by process tracing (Checkel 2006; 2008), which checks 
developments against the theory presented here and descriptive data in the next 
section, comparing across time and with different types of elite interviewee.  
 
3. THE ANNUAL BUDGET AMOUNTS OF 2007 TO 2015: CONTINUITY OR 
CHANGE? 
This section compares the amounts approved in the annual budgets of 2007 to 2010, 
decided before the adoption of the new rules of the Lisbon Treaty, and the amounts 
voted in the subsequent six budgets of 2011-2016. Were the amounts agreed 
significantly lower after 2010 and did the spending preferences of the Council and 
EP narrow? 
Table A1 presents descriptive data to show amounts agreed for expenditure 
throughout the period of 2007-2016. These include commitments and payments, the 
amounts in agreed budgets before the start of each financial year, and the amounts 
disbursed in final budgets (usually more though not always). Amounts are reported 
for the major headings or areas of spending. 
Table A1 also reports the percentage differences between the amounts voted by the 
Council (C%) and the EP (EP%) before any meeting of the conciliation committee, 
and the agreed and final amounts. For example, in 2007, the agreed amount of total 
commitments was 0.63 percent above the Council’s preference but 0.62 percent 
below the EP’s preference. The closer that this figure is to zero percent, the more an 
institution has “won” in terms of the agreed or final amount. The agreed budget is 
concluded in November or December for the year to follow. The final budget includes 
that amount plus or minus the effect of amending budgets passed during the 
respective financial year. 
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An area of controversy is the distinction between commitments and payments. While 
agreed commitments for 2007 were €127bn, the total for payments was lower at 
€115bn. The difference between commitments and payments is known as RAL 
(reste à liquider). Commitments are set as the upper limit to which the EU commits 
itself in spending programmes. A proportion of payments is released at the start of a 
project. On completion, any remaining balance in payments is released if the 
recipient has complied with the conditions. Some payments honour commitments 
made several years earlier and there is often an under-spend when a recipient has 
not fully implemented an agreed programme. Some national governments wish to 
cut payments because that will mean that the amount disbursed will be lower. 
Commitments are legally binding so long as all their conditions are met and therefore 
have to be honoured with payments. The EP has compromised with lower payments 
on occasions that the Council gives way on commitments. In fact, the political “cost” 
of Council concessions on commitments is low since they are not immediately 
disbursed. 
The Council and EP do not have absolute freedom of amendment in the annual 
budget for amounts below the ceilings (or spending maximums). 80 percent of 
commitments are pre-allocated for policy areas between member states and this 
includes Cohesion (heading 1b) and Agriculture (within heading 2), although this 
does not affect payments, which can be reduced while commitments are maintained 
unless a policy is non-differentiated (see below). In practice, commitments can be 
below the ceilings if the Council or EP have doubts about the absorption capacities 
of recipients. Furthermore, most of headings 2 and 5 (Administration) are non-
differentiated,v meaning that payments will normally follow commitments since local 
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co-financing of EU money is not needed,vi and this means that there will be very little 
variance in the agricultural funds voted under heading 2.  
We see that the degree to which either the EP or Council “lose” in agreed 
commitments is often lower than 1 percent. In agreed payments, we see a different 
picture (Table A1). In 2007, the agreed payments were 5.34 percent less than what 
the EP had demanded, with the EP losing by 6.74 percent in 2009. From 2011 to 
2015 the EP lost by between 3.04 and 3.67 percent. (The exceptions were the 
budget of 2014 where the EP’s loss was only 0.42 percent because the EP linked 
that figure to its ratification of the MFF for 2014-2020 just one month later, and the 
budget of 2016 where the EP’s loss was 1.76 percent due to the extra funds voted to 
address the refugee crisis.) These last figures from the post-Lisbon period seem to 
show that the EP’s losses diminished. However, the degree to which the Council was 
forced to accept a slightly higher budget than it wanted almost vanished from 2011. 
In the preceding years, the agreed payments were between 0.77 and 2.00 percent 
higher than the level requested by the Council. In 2011 and 2012, agreed payments 
were equal to the Council’s request and in 2013 and 2015 were only 0.11 and 0.87 
higher. For the 2014 annual budget, the Council went halfway with the EP to secure 
approval of the MFF, and for 2016, the Council agreed payments 1.24 percent above 
its preference to address the refugee crisis. 
Council won by a greater degree in payments since 2011 although the gap between 
the payments preferences of the Council and EP has also narrowed. Compared to 
agreed budgets, final budgets that include amending budgets increase for 
commitments and, since 2010, do so also for payments. Since 2012, the Council has 
agreed to final payments above the amounts that the EP requested, reaching a peak 
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for 2013, pending the approval of the MFF for 2014-2020. The only annual fall in 
spending occurred for 2014 due to the entry into force of the new, lower MFF. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 illustrates whether the Council or EP won in agreed and final amounts for 
both commitments and payments from 2007 to 2016. When the degree of win was 
below 1 percent, it is reported as a draw. Final commitments were set by the EP 
before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, with draws or EP wins occurring 
afterwards. Agreed payments were won by the Council in every year except for the 
draws of 2014 and 2016 discussed above. Final payments (including amending 
budgets) were won by the Council before the Lisbon Treaty. In 2012 and 2013, final 
payments were closer to the EP’s preferences. Put simply, after 2010 when the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force, a loss in amounts for the EP has not happened, 
seeming to refute hypothesis 1. In view of the figures in Table A1 and the 
confrontation between the Council and the EP in concluding the budget of 2011 
(discussed below), this finding needs treating with caution. 
Table A1 shows that after 2010 (and except for 2014), gross amounts in the annual 
budgets were not reduced year by year.vii Instead the Council imposed figures lower 
than what the EP wanted. As Table A2 (see appendix) illustrates, the mean 
percentage differences demanded by each institution narrowed after 2010, showing 
that the Council and EP may have moderated their positions to avoid the effects of a 
reversion point, confirming hypothesis 2.2. The decline in the mean differences in 
payments voted by the Council and EP hold when comparing the first three years of 
the 2007-2013 MFF to the first three years of the one for 2014-2020. 
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Hypothesis 2.1 on lower amounts is partly correct so long as Council wants lower 
spending than the EP, as was the case for 2011 when commitments and payments 
in the agreed and final budgets were tightly controlled by the Council, which has 
continued to keep agreed payments low thereafter. After 2011, commitments and 
final payments though not agreed payments have been higher. 
This suggests that the Council wants to provide spending but by drip-feed. Releasing 
delayed payments is less visible and less toxic politically for the member states that 
make up the pivot for qualified majority voting in the Council.   
 
4. THE ANNUAL BUDGETS AFTER 2010: WHAT HAPPENED? 
Drawing on elite interviews and original documents, this section analyses the effect 
of the new Lisbon rules after 2010 on amounts voted and the powers of the 
institutions. Interviews were undertaken with senior policy officials. From the EP, 
these included the rapporteur of the 2012 budget and party group advisors on the 
budget from the European People’s Party (EPP), Socialist (S&D), Liberal (ALDE) 
and hard Eurosceptic (EFD) groups. From EcoFin, interviews were held with key 
officials from the Permanent Representation or the national Finance Ministry of two 
member states. A senior official from the Budgets DG of the European Commission 
was also interviewed. Each of the interviewees was involved in the trilogue and 
conciliation processes for the budget of 2011. The interviewees represented different 
policy and institutional preferences to minimise bias (Rathbun 2009) while informing 
the development of the process.  
The section is subdivided as follows: first, a subsection looks at the negotiation 
process for the 2011 budget, the first time under the new rules; second, the budgets 
for 2012 and 2013, which completed the disbursal of funds from the 2007-2013 MFF, 
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amid negotiations for the following MFF, and once the experience of the new rules 
from the 2011 budget had been taken on board; and third, the budgets of 2014 to 
2016, which were agreed under the 2014-2020 MFF in conditions of more restrained 
spending. 
 
4.1. 2011: The first time under new rules 
The negotiations on the 2011 budget failed during the conciliation phase due to 
irreconcilable policy difference and institutional inertia that included: 
 
 Adaptation to the new rules 
 The new threat of a reversion point that had shifted 
 The question of flexibility in the budget, roll-overs and shifting amounts 
between headings 
 The attempt of the EP to insert conditions on the MFF and the EU’s revenue 
base 
 
Commitments were eventually agreed at a level between the preferences of the 
Council and EP, while payments were at or close to the preferences of the Council 
(Table 1). Unlike for 2010, the EP failed to set commitments. 
According to more than one source,viii the EP treated the new procedure’s single 
reading in the same way as its old first reading. ‘The old procedure was one where 
Council cut and the EP increased as negotiating positions before a compromise. 
This was attempted by the EP in October and November 2010 but was incompatible 
with the new rules.’ix 
15 
 
When the conciliation committee for the 2011 budget failed to agree, the budget had 
to be re-proposed for the first time since 1987. Within a few weeks a new budget 
was agreed. The threat of a reversion point budget and its consequences 
strengthened the bargaining position of the governments in the Council for a more 
modest budget. Table A1 shows that the Council obtained payments and 
commitments in both the agreed and final budgets of 2011 at no further than 0.3 
percent away from its preferences. 
Disagreement was public: the Belgian Budgets Minister and President of EcoFin, 
Melchior Wathelet, stated that the Council would release fewer payments for 
structural funds under heading 1b because of its doubts over the absorption capacity 
of many member states. Meanwhile, Alain Lamassoure, chairman of the EP’s 
Budgets Committee, noted that the EP’s amendments for payments were modest 
and below the MFF ceilings for the first time in 20 years (Agence Europe 2010).  
Later, the EP clarified its demand ‘to accommodate new policy priorities as well as 
negotiations on new sources of financing’, to extend its power over revenue within 
the 2011 budget, with the ‘new revenue sources including transferring unspent 
money to future budgets instead of returning it to Member States’. The Budgets 
Committee insisted that negotiations on revenue were a ‘full part of the overall 
agreement on the 2011 budget’ (EP 2010a). The Committee also asserted the full 
involvement of the EP in the negotiations for the MFF of 2014-2020. 
With the start of conciliation, the Budgets Committee accepted the Council’s figures; 
it is the case that a reversion point budget would have allowed the EP “freezes-only” 
powers (Article 315 TFEU). The EP’s President, Jerzy Buzek, stated that ‘[i]n return’ 
for accepting the Council figures, ‘we request from the Council an institutional and 
political commitment on the future financing of EU policies’ (EP 2010b).  
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The conciliation process failed despite agreement on expenditure, because there 
was no agreement on the questions of revenue and the MFF. As one press agency 
wrote, ‘Sources close to the discussions said the UK, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Latvia had collaborated to end Belgian EU presidency efforts to 
broker a compromise. Softer support for the tough member-state position also came 
from France, Germany, Austria and Finland’ (AFP quoted by Willis [2010]). The 
above countries include members of the Noordwijk Group. 
The Commission re-proposed a budget according to the Council’s figures. The EP 
accepted them but with a political agreement that amending budgets would be 
agreed during the following year to top-up any funds on a case-by-case basis (EP 
2010c). As noted in the previous section, Table A1 shows that the funds provided in 
amending budgets have increased since 2011 and mean that final budgets for each 
year except 2014 are higher. Hypothesis 2.1, which suggests that there is less 
money, is therefore unproven except for the annual budget of 2011. 
Interviews have revealed that the failure of the conciliation committee for the 2011 
budget was due primarily to the new rules, which reduced the EP’s negotiating 
power, but ‘these interacted with politics and economics’, while the EP’s conciliation 
delegation for 2011 lacked experience with the new procedure.x According to one 
official, the Council ‘talked austerity’ in both 2010 and 2011 but the economic 
situation would not have led to the failed procedure of 2011 without the new treaty 
rules.xi According to another official, conciliation failed due to a combination of the 
EP’s attempt to use leverage on the MFF to secure policy concessions and the effect 
of the Lisbon Treaty in making the procedure more time-restricted.xii The unresolved 
issue was the question of whether unspent amounts in the budget could be rolled 
over or moved between policy headings – and on this, the Council insisted on 
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unanimity.xiii The EP was successful with the tactic of trying to extend its own de 
facto powers in the past as Hix (2002) explains with regard to non-budgetary matters 
in the Amsterdam Treaty, but it failed on this occasion because it continued to 
behave without having adapted to the situation of new rules. 
At conciliation in October 2010, the contentious parts were the issues on which the 
EP insisted: flexibility (shifting amounts between headings or roll-overs of 
underspends), revenue, and negotiation of the MFF. 
In December, the EP received a written guarantee from the forthcoming presidencies 
of the Council that it would be involved in discussions on the MFF. The reason why 
the conciliation for the 2011 budget failed in November 2010 was that the EP chose 
to link it to reform of the MFF, which is an area the Council can only decide 
unanimously, and so agreement on the annual budget of 2011 required unanimity 
and not a qualified majority as a result of the behaviour of the EP.xiv 
The evidence from the budget of 2011 shows that when the EP and Council 
disagree, the EP’s powers are indeed reduced, confirming hypothesis 1. Gross 
reductions in spending did not follow though spending was lower than proposed by 
the Commission, leaving hypothesis 2.1 proven only in part. 
 
4.2. The budgets of 2012 and 2013: amounts and power 
The budget of 2011 had been conflictual, the first time under new rules, and 
coincided with an attempt by the EP to link it to the negotiations on the MFF and EU 
revenue. This subsection looks at the budgets of 2012 and 2013, agreed as the last 
ones under the MFF of 2007-2013 and once the new procedure had become more 
familiar to the political actors. Like the budget of 2011, that of 2013 was not agreed 




 Adaptation to the new rules (still, but only for 2012) 
 Amending budgets to add more spending  
 RAL and the payments backlog 
 Negotiation of the MFF (only for 2013) 
 
For both budgets of 2012 and 2013, final commitments and final payments were 
closer to the EP’s preferences, agreed payments were a win for the Council and 
agreed commitments were a draw (Table 1). 
In common with 2011, the figure for payments in the agreed budget of 2012 was 
identical to the figure demanded by the Council and 3 percent less than that 
demanded by the EP (Table A1). However, the 2012 budget was concluded at 
conciliation. 
The Commission proposed the Draft Budget for 2012 with a 4.9 percent increase in 
payments on the previous year, in line with the ceilings of the MFF. Commissioner 
Janusz Lewandowski claimed that the increases were ‘necessary to meet already-
made spending commitments, particularly in the area of EU regional policy’ (Willis 
2011).  
France and Germany delayed the 2012 budget not on its figures but on the sixth 
amending budget for 2011. Previous commitments meant that there was a shortfall 
of €550 million in the European Social Fund (ESF), for which the Council offered 
€200 million. The Polish presidency negotiated directly with the French and German 
ministers but did not speak with members of the core Noordwijk Group because they 
were unshifting in their opposition and too few to form a blocking minority against a 
qualified majority.xv As part of the package deal, the EP accepted €400 million for 
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Amending Budget 6, in exchange for which it succeeded in setting the commitments 
for 2012. The EP prizes commitments, since it may be able to force through future 
payments to cover them.xvi 
In November 2011 at conciliation, the EP conceded on payments having demanded 
an increase of 5.2 percent a few weeks earlier. One official described this habitual 
approach as an ‘out-of-date, out-of-touch tactic, particularly since [the EP] gave in so 
easily’,xvii while another remarked: ‘We need to revise this tactic due to the single 
reading situation. The tactic was only credible when we could overpower the Council 
on non-compulsory expenditure.’xviii 
Despite the disagreements on payments but not commitments for 2012 and 
Amending Budget 6 for 2011, the procedure for 2012 ran more smoothly than that for 
2011. This was because the questions of revenue, flexibility, and the MFF were not 
on the agenda. The EP separated the issues and kept the argument on revenue out 
of the budget for 2012 so that the spending priorities for technological investment 
under the Europe 2020 programme remained within the ambit of EU rather than 
intergovernmental funding.xix In short, concluding the agreed 2012 budget was easier 
but the EP still lost in terms of agreed payments compared to before 2010, 
confirming hypotheses 1 and, in part, 2.1.   
  
The 2013 budget was again one where the EP lost on agreed payments but where 
final payments exceeded the EP’s demands (Table A1). The procedure was affected 
by negotiations of the MFF for 2014-2020, which had stalled. The EP refused 
agreement at the conciliation committee. The Commission proposed a new draft in 
December 2012 that was accepted in the shadow of a reversion budget. 
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Amending budgets for 2012 to cover outgoings not accounted for in the agreed 2012 
budget played a role in delaying agreement on the 2013 budget. The EP (2012a) 
emphasised expenditure on R&D and investment in economic growth (EP 2012b): 
‘MEPs highlighted the contradictions between the agreement among EU Heads of 
state – who at their 29 June summit agreed on a Growth Pact with extra money for 
growth, research and innovation – and the severe cuts proposed by member states’ 
civil servants for next year’s budget (inter alia minus 15% for research and 
innovation and minus 25% for small business development)’. In October, the Council 
position moderated the rise in payments by the 2.8 percent inflation rate in the 
budget of 2013 given the conditions of national austerity (Agence Europe 2012a). 
The Commission countered that its planned increase was needed to meet bills for 
projects approved under the commitments of 2010, when the economic crisis was 
already under way (Agence Europe 2012b). Whereas agreed payments in 2013 for 
Competitiveness (including R&D) under heading 1a were €12bn, final payments 
increased these to €16bn. 
Non-agreement on amending budgets for 2012 worth €9bn for Lifelong Learning, 
Rural Development, the ESF, Cohesion, and the Seventh Research Framework 
caused the conciliation committee to fail (EP 2012c). Once the Commission had re-
proposed a new budget for 2013, the EP stated that the bills for 2012 had to be met 
separately (EP 2012d). The Council then agreed to fund €6bn out of €9bn 
outstanding payments for 2012 (Fox 2012). 
The experience of the budget of 2013 shows a reduction in power of the EP leading 
to non-agreement at conciliation and lesser spending with regard to agreed 
payments, yet an increase in commitments and in final payments. This makes 
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confirming hypotheses 1 and 2.1 problematic for 2013, although the continued 
convergence of spending preferences (Table A2) confirms hypothesis 2.2.   
 
4.3. Into the multiannual financial period of 2014-2020 
This subsection continues the analysis for the first three years of the 2014-2020 
MFF, which included again a budget not agreed by the conciliation committee for 
2015. Consistent with 2012-2013, policy disputes focused on: 
 
 Negotiations of the MFF (for 2014 only) 
 RAL and the payments backlog 
 
Were there winners and losers or effects on levels of spending? Table 1 shows that 
draws between the Council and EP continued for agreed commitments and that 
Council control of agreed payments weakened although this was due to the EP’s 
extraction of higher payments for 2014 linked to the MFF (see below) and to the 
demands of the refugee crisis for 2016. The EP’s previous successes in final 
commitments and payments were discontinued, supporting hypothesis 1.  
For the 2014 budget, the EP had greater leverage due to the delay in its approval of 
the MFF for 2014-2020, which had reduced multiannual payments from 1.00 to 0.95 
percent of GNI, with a similar reduction in commitments. The EP made approval for 
this reduced MFF conditional on agreement of more generous payments for 2014 
and for the remaining amending budgets for 2013 during the autumn of 2013 (EP 
2013; Agence Europe 2013), as Ivailo Kalfin MEP (2013), the co-rapporteur for the 
2014-2020 MFF wrote: ‘These additional payments are needed because in previous 
periods the member states disbursed insufficient resources and now they have to 
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pay the bills to the amount they had previously agreed… [T]he Parliament was very 
clear that without covering these amounts, there can be neither MFF, nor 2014 
budget.’ The amending budgets for 2013 were also exceptional, temporarily 
increasing final payments from €136bn in 2012 to €153bn in 2013, then falling to 
€139bn in 2014. 
At conciliation, Council agreed to increase payments compared to its first reading 
due to concern over the EP’s ratification of the reduced MFF (Potteau 2014: 810). 
The non-agreement reversion point for the MFF would have been a roll-over of the 
unreduced amounts in the pre-existing MFF of 2007-2013 (Article 312 TFEU) which 
the Council wanted to avoid. Thus it conceded on payments for 2014 and in the 
amending (final) budgets for 2013. 
 
For the 2015 budget, the conciliation committee failed to agree in November 2014, 
the third occasion since ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Disagreement occurred not 
on account of the figures for 2015 but due to the EP and Commission positions that 
a growing backlog of payments over the years had to be addressed through 
amending budgets (Barroso 2014) as in previous years. The tighter levels for 
spending in the MFF of 2014-2020 and adjustment in member state contributions 
also affected agreement (Georgieva 2014). The Council of the EU (2014) 
emphasised ‘member states’ efforts to consolidate their public finances’, noting that 
‘the overall economic situation remains fragile.’ A reintroduced budget a month later 
was agreed that conformed exactly to Council’s preferences in commitments and 
was only 0.87 percent away from its preferred figure for payments. On payments, the 




The agreed budget for 2016 was a draw in commitments and payments (Table 1). 
The only significant loss for the EP lay in commitments for heading 1a 
(Competitiveness). The Commission proposed an increase of 22 percent for heading 
4 (Global Europe) in response to the refugee crisis (Council of the EU 2015a), which 
the Council accepted (Council of the EU 2015b). The EP (2015) unsuccessfully 
called for a windfall to the budget of €2.3bn in fines to be spent on the refugee crisis. 
During negotiations, the Council accepted commitments 5 percent higher than its 
original preference for heading 4 and nearly 12 percent higher in payments, given 
the refugee crisis, and these payments also overshot the EP’s original preference.  
 
The findings in this section agree with hypothesis 1 that the EP’s powers have been 
reduced but for agreed rather than final budgets, and this is only because the EP 
prefers more spending than the Council. The case of 2011 shows that when Council 
and EP disagree, Council can (if it wishes) cut payments and commitments in the 
agreed and final budgets. The MFF-related occasion of the final 2013 budget and 
agreed 2014 budget was an exception that allowed the EP to extract concessions. 
The interviews and other evidence have shown that a qualified majority in the 
Council can secure lower amounts than those wanted by the EP though the 
Council’s qualified majority has not chosen to reduce payments year by year; indeed 
agreed payments have increased by modest amounts but below the preferences of 
the EP. Hypothesis 2.1 that spending is cut is therefore confirmed only in part but 
remains true for all parts of the budget in 2011 and for agreed payments since then 
except for 2014 (the start of the new MFF) and 2016 (the refugee crisis). Hypothesis 
2.2 offers more explanatory power that public preferences of the Council and EP 
narrow in response to the threat of the reversion point; table A2 shows that the mean 
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figure for differences in payment preferences in 2014-2016 is less than half of that of 
the first three years of the previous MFF in 2007-2009.    
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper summarised the significance of the changes in the powers of the annual 
budget of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty. It proposed reversion points in relation to 
the preferences of institutional actors as a means for analysing who will be better 
able to determine spending. Next, it evaluated the amounts of budgetary funds voted 
by the EU and desired by the EP or the Council from both before and after 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, it analysed events for the five annual 
budgetary procedures completed since 2010, of which three resulted in temporary 
breakdowns of the annual budgetary system – the first ones since 1987. Process 
tracing guided the analysis and allowed a comparison between time periods, policy 
headings, types of budget, and different types of qualitative evidence. 
Following Benedetto and Høyland (2007), I predicted via hypothesis 1 that the rules 
of the Lisbon Treaty would reduce the budgetary power of the EP as a punctuated 
equilibrium (Citi 2013). Hypothesis 2.1 predicted a fall in expenditure and hypothesis 
2.2 predicted a narrowing in Council and EP public spending preferences due to the 
new rules. The institution lying further from the reversion point will lose if there is 
disagreement (Figures 1 and 2) either by being overpowered as in the 2011 budget 
or by conceding to avoid the reversion point. In linking its positions to policy 
questions concerned with revenue and budget flexibility, the EP sought to maximise 
its power in the budget of 2011 but failed precisely because this placed it further from 
the reversion point.  
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The budget of 2011 where the Council set lower agreed and final commitments and 
payments than wanted by the EP, and which continued for agreed payments 
thereafter, supports hypothesis 1 concerning reduced powers for the EP and 
hypothesis 2.1 on lower amounts being disbursed. Since 2011, the gap between the 
Council’s and EP’s preferences has narrowed. This supports hypothesis 2.2 since 
fear of a reversion budget moderates positions for agreed payments, although the 
narrowed gap could reflect the willingness of Council to allow more generous 
commitments and delayed payments. 
After 2011, the Council released more generous increases in commitments and in 
final payments, which were less visible in the domestic politics of some member 
states. The effect was to deliver more spending that the EP wanted but via 
commitments and a drip-feed of delayed payments. This means that the power of the 
purse resides with the Council, whose pivotal members can benefit domestically 
from curtailing agreed payments, which are the most visible part of the budget, but 
may not notice the disbursal of delayed payments and the promissory notes of 
commitments. 
The paper offers four findings relevant to comparative budgetary analysis: i) it bears 
out the claims of Wehner (2010) on the importance of amendment powers in 
understanding budgetary institutions and of the relevance of reversion points; ii) the 
reversion point may never be activated but the credible threat of doing so is enough 
to change the behaviour of political actors; iii) it has shown how institutional change 
can produce winners and losers in terms of policy outcome (changes to spending) if 
there is strong disagreement as for the 2011 budget; and iv) changes can be further 
complicated if they interact with institutionalised behaviour as shown by the EP that 
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miscalculated its position and continued to behave as if the old rules still applied, 
while negotiating the budget for 2011. 
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Figure 1 Closeness to the Budget Reversion Point – who wins before the Lisbon Treaty? 
 
SQ: Status quo, RP: Reversion point, CE: Compulsory Expenditure, NCE: Non-compulsory 
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Table 1 Winners in each year’s agreed and final commitments and payments, 2007-2016 
 
 Commitments Payments 
 Agreed Final Agreed Final 
2007 Draw EP Council Council 
2008 Draw EP Council Council 
2009 Council EP Council Council 
2010 EP EP Council Council 
2011 Draw Draw Council Council 
2012 Draw EP Council EP 
2013 Draw EP Council EP 
2014 Draw Draw Draw Draw 
2015 Draw Draw Council Council 
2016 Draw N/A Draw N/A 






Table A1 Agreed and final budgets, with percentage increases or decreases reported for the Council and the European 
Parliament 
  2007 Agreed Budget Final Budget   2008 Agreed Budget Final Budget  
  €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% 
COMMITMENTS                         
1a Competitiveness 9368 +6.67 +6.01 56060 +3.30 +3.20 11086 +16.65 +12.59 11082 +16.61 +12.55 
1b Cohesion 45487 0.00 0.00 * * *  46878 0.00 0.00 47256 +0.81 +0.81 
2 Natural Resources 55250 -2.16 -4.09 58399 +3.41 +1.37 55041 -1.23 -2.39 55560 -0.29 -1.47 
4 Global Europe 6812 +3.32 +0.64 7142 +8.33 +5.52 7311 +2.55 +0.97 7551 +5.92 +4.28 
5 Administration 6942 +1.64 -0.20 7291 +6.75 +4.82 7284 +1.31 -0.03 7279 +1.24 -0.10 
 Total 126551 +0.63 -0.62 130881 +4.07 +2.78 129150 +0.58 -0.41 130570 +1.69 +0.69 
  GNI% 1.08   1.12   1.03   1.04   
PAYMENTS               
1a Competitiveness 7072 +4.49 -25.88 6663 -1.55 -30.17 9773 +8.71 -2.21 9715 +8.07 -2.79 
1b Cohesion 37790 +1.14 -5.29 36975 -1.04 -7.33 40552 +1.06 -4.46 36016 -10.24 -15.15 
2 Natural Resources 54719 -0.32 -2.56 53845 -1.91 -4.11 53177 -1.92 -3.12 53217 -1.85 -3.04 
4 Global Europe 7353 +1.25 -6.14 7188 -1.02 -8.25 8113 +7.41 -0.25 7847 +3.89 -3.52 
5 Administration 6942 +1.64 -0.20 7227 +5.81 +3.90 7284 +1.29 -0.03 7280 +1.23 -0.09 
 Total 115497 +0.77 -5.34 113846 -0.67 -6.69 120347 +0.78 -3.10 115771 -3.05 -6.78 
 GNI% 0.99   0.97   0.96   0.92   
*In the consolidated accounts and annual report for 2007, the final commitments for headings 1a and 1b were combined. 
For the sake of space, heading 3 (Freedom, Security, Justice, Citizenship) is excluded because it accounts for less than 2 percent of the EU’s budget. 






  2009 Agreed Budget Final Budget   2010 Agreed Budget Final Budget  
  €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% 
COMMITMENTS                         
1a Competitiveness 11769 +5.91 +4.44 13775 +23.96 +22.24 14862 +22.12 +3.45 14863 +22.13 +3.46 
1b Cohesion 48427 +0.03 +0.01 48427 +0.03 +0.01 49388 +0.01 0.00 49387 +0.01 0.00 
2 Natural Resources 56121 -1.79 -4.44 56697 -0.79 -3.46 59499 +1.46 -0.52 59499 +1.46 -0.52 
4 Global Europe 8104 +7.28 +5.47 8104 +7.28 +5.47 8141 +7.36 0.00 8141 +7.36 0.00 
5 Administration 7701 +1.96 0.00 7597 +0.58 -1.35 7889 +0.99 +0.29 7908 +1.23 +0.53 
 Total 133846 -0.06 -1.60 136951 +2.26 +0.68 141453 +2.54 -0.21 141522 +2.59 -0.16 
  GNI% 1.03   1.05   1.20   1.20   
PAYMENTS               
1a Competitiveness 11024 +12.33 -3.16 10318 +5.14 -9.36 11342 +7.26 -9.75 11339 +7.23 -9.77 
1b Cohesion 34975 +0.90 -10.33 34887 +0.65 -10.56 36385 +0.82 -6.34 37461 +3.80 -3.57 
2 Natural Resources 52566 -3.26 -7.24 50276 -7.48 -11.28 58136 +0.96 -1.39 57020 -0.98 -3.29 
4 Global Europe 8324 +15.82 +2.05 8100 +12.7 -0.70 7788 +8.83 -0.45 7788 +8.83 -0.45 
5 Administration 7701 +1.96 0.00 7600 +0.62 -1.31 7889 +0.99 +0.31 7907 +1.22 +0.54 
 Total 116096 +0.98 -6.74 113035 -1.68 -9.20 122937 +2.00 -3.60 122956 +2.02 -3.59 







  2011 Agreed Budget Final Budget   2012 Agreed Budget Final Budget  
  €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% 
COMMITMENTS                         
1a Competitiveness 13521 +0.98 +0.27 13521 +0.98 +0.27 14753 +1.55 +0.13 15389 +5.93 +4.45 
1b Cohesion 50981 0.02 0.00 50984 +0.03 +0.01 52753 +0.03 0.00 52753 +0.03 0.00 
2 Natural Resources 58659 -0.60 -2.03 58659 -0.60 -2.03 59976 +0.61 -0.80 59850 +0.40 -1.01 
4 Global Europe 8754 +2.75 +0.82 8759 +2.81 +0.88 9406 +2.17 -0.62 9404 +2.15 -0.64 
5 Administration 8082 -0.14 -1.71 8173 +0.98 -0.60 8280 +0.86 +0.29 8280 +0.86 +0.29 
 Total 141818 +0.03 -0.88 142194 +0.30 -0.62 147232 +0.67 -0.36 148428 +1.49 +0.45 
  GNI% 1.13   1.13   1.12   1.13   
PAYMENTS               
1a Competitiveness 11646 +3.81 -3.99 11604 +3.44 -4.33 11501 +0.59 -8.42 11971 +4.70 -4.68 
1b Cohesion 41683 +0.52 -2.04 42390 +2.22 -0.38 43836 0.00 -2.90 48504 +10.65 +7.44 
2 Natural Resources 56409 -1.58 -2.90 55794 -2.65 -3.96 57034 -0.22 -2.08 58016 +1.50 -0.39 
4 Global Europe 7249 +3.39 -5.19 7053 +0.59 -7.75 6955 -0.54 -5.50 6777 -3.09 -7.92 
5 Administration 8080 -0.17 -1.75 8172 +0.97 -0.63 8278 +0.84 +0.27 8278 +0.84 +0.27 
 Total 126527 0.00 -3.09 126727 +0.16 -2.94 129088 0.00 -3.04 135758 +5.17 +1.97 






  2013 Agreed Budget Final Budget   2014 Agreed Budget Final Budget  
  €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% 
COMMITMENTS                         
1a Competitiveness 16121 +3.59 +0.56 19191 +23.32 +19.71 16484 +1.73 -0.07 16484 +1.73 -0.07 
1b Cohesion 54509 +0.03 +0.02 55863 +2.51 +2.50 47502 -0.12 -0.28 47502 -0.12 -0.28 
2 Natural Resources 60149 +0.30 -0.26 62540 +4.29 +3.70 59267 +3.91 -0.04 59191 +3.78 -1.65 
4 Global Europe 9583 +3.10 +1.23 10015 +7.75 +5.79 8325 +2.03 -0.72 8423 +3.23 +0.45 
5 Administration 8431 +0.39 -1.32 9281 +10.51 +8.63 8405 -0.44 -2.35 8405 -0.44 -2.35 
 Total 150898 +0.75 -0.17 159810 +13.52 +5.73 142640 +0.20 0.00 142690 +0.24 +0.04 
  GNI% 1.13   1.20   1.05   1.05   
PAYMENTS               
1a Competitiveness 11886 +1.98 -12.30 16290 +39.77 +20.20 11441 +1.54 -2.38 11857 +5.23 +1.17 
1b Cohesion 47199 -0.37 -3.63 57238 +20.82 +16.87 50952 +0.12 -0.29 54006 +6.12 +5.69 
2 Natural Resources 57484 +0.02 -0.83 60404 +5.10 +4.21 56459 +0.05 -0.16 55959 -0.83 -1.05 
4 Global Europe 6323 +0.72 -13.53 7200 +14.69 -1.54 6191 +1.58 -2.43 6925 +13.62 +9.14 
5 Administration 8430 +0.37 -1.35 10056 +19.73 +17.68 8406 -0.44 -2.35 8406 -0.44 -2.35 
 Total 132837 +0.11 -3.67 153461 +15.65 +11.29 135505 +0.37 -0.42 139034 +2.98 +2.17 






  2015 Agreed Budget Final Budget 2016 Agreed Budget 
  €M C% EP% €M C% EP% €M C% EP% 
COMMITMENTS                   
1a Competitiveness 17552 +2.50 -0.65 17124 +2.50 -0.65 19010 +1.22 -6.48 
1b Cohesion 49230 +0.01 -0.03 49227 +22.70 +22.65 50831 +0.02 -0.92 
2 Natural Resources 58809 -0.63 -0.83 59183 +7.93 +7.07 62484 -0.67 -1.78 
4 Global Europe 8408 +0.78 -3.89 8343 +4.42 -0.41 9167 +5.15 +0.26 
5 Administration 8661 +0.89 -0.25 8585 +0.87 -0.26 8935 +0.64 +0.25 
 Total 145322 +0.17 -0.72 145077 +11.85 +10.86 155004 +1.13 -1.54 
  GNI% N/A         
PAYMENTS          
1a Competitiveness 15798 +10.88 -0.60 15729 +10.39 -1.03 17418 +1.96 -3.29 
1b Cohesion 51125 -0.50 -6.98 51125 -0.50 -6.98 48844 +0.01 -2.75 
2 Natural Resources 55999 -1.34 -1.68 55979 -1.38 -1.71 55121 -0.89 -2.24 
4 Global Europe 7422 +6.90 -1.20 7478 +7.71 -0.45 10156 +11.74 +5.00 
5 Administration 8659 +0.86 -0.15 8659 +0.86 -0.15 8935 +0.63 +0.25 
 Total 141214 +0.87 -3.55 141280 +0.92 -3.51 143885 +1.24 -1.76 
 GNI% N/A   N/A   N/A   
 




Table A2 Percentage difference between Council and EP preferences, 2007-2016 
 
 Commitments Payments 
2007 1.26 6.45 
2008 0.99 4.00 
2009 1.57 8.28 
2010 2.76 5.81 
2011 0.92 3.19 
2012 1.03 3.14 
2013 0.92 3.92 
2014 0.20 0.79 
2015 0.90 4.58 
2016 2.71 3.05 
Mean 2007-2010 1.65 6.14 
Mean 2011-2016 1.11 3.11 
Mean 2007-2009 1.27 6.24 







i The MFFs last up to seven years and govern the maximum spending by year that is permitted for the EU. For 
2007-2013, this was set at 1.048 percent of gross national income (GNI), falling to 1.00 percent after 2013. 
ii Compulsory expenditure was linked to agriculture, fisheries and aspects of foreign policy, compulsory since 
these were items under which the EU was contractually obliged to provide financing. It accounted for 
approximately 40 percent of spending by 2009. The remaining 60 percent was deemed non-compulsory and 
included cohesion spending for deprived regions, as well as investment to promote growth and competitiveness. 
iii Interview, EcoFin official #1, 15 December 2011. 
iv Given credence by interview with EcoFin official #2, 15 January 2014: ‘The Commission’s DG Budget is not 
able to manage spending demands from within the Commission so it is up to EcoFin to behave like the EU’s 
collective Finance Ministry.’ 
v See appropriations at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/glossary/glossary_en.cfm (accessed 29 August 
2015). 
vi I am grateful to Alan Matthews for his advice on pre-allocation and non-differentiation. 
vii However, at the start of the 2014-2020 MFF, commitments in the agreed budget fell from €151bn in 2013 to 
€143bn in 2014. The EP could use approval of the MFF as a means to extract slightly higher payments in the 
2014 annual budget. 
viii Interviews: Commission official, 23 June 2011; EP policy advisor #2, 23 June 2011; EP policy advisor #3, 8 
December 2011. 
ix Interview, EP policy advisor #3, 8 December 2011. 
x Interviews: EP policy advisor #1, 22 June 2011; EP policy advisor #2, 23 June 2011. In an interview on 21 
June 2011, the budgets advisor (#4) to the EFD (Eurosceptic) group expressed different policy preferences from 
the advisors of the EPP, S&D and ALDE groups but confirmed the same process of events as the others for the 
breakdown of conciliation in November 2010. 
xi Interview, EP policy advisor #3, 8 December 2011. 
xii Interview, Commission official, 23 June 2011. 
xiii Interview, EP policy advisor #2, 23 June 2011. 
xiv Interview, EcoFin official #1, 15 December 2011. 
xv Interview, EP policy advisor #2, 6 December 2011. 
xvi Interview, Commission official, 7 December 2011. 
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xvii Interview, Commission official, 7 December 2011. 
xviii Interview, EP policy advisor #2, 6 December 2011. 
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